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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIMITATIONS FOR NEW
YORK INFANTS-TIME FOR A CHANGE OF TIME?
EUGENE T. MACCARRONET & VICTOR D. LOPEZT
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's
New York passed legal reforms that included Civil Practice Laws
and Rules ("CPLR") § 214-a allowing for a two and one-half year
statute of limitations for instituting a claim for medical
malpractice.1 This provision was part of New York's effort to limit
judgments for medical malpractice, and consequently curtail
skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums and costs,
as well as allay fear of a decrease in willingness of medical
practitioners to provide medical services.2 As an accommodation
to persons with certain disabilities, including infancy,3 the CPLR
contains a tolling provision, which provides that where the statute
of limitations is less than three years as for medical malpractice
T Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra University, Frank G.
Zarb School of Business. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of a
summer research grant from the Zarb School of Business that facilitated the
research for this article.
TT Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, Hofstra University, Frank
G. Zarb School of Business. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of
a summer research grant from the Zarb School of Business that facilitated the
research for this article.
1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2015).
2 See generally Governor's Mem. on L. 1975, ch. 109, 1975 NY Legis Ann. at
225 (regarding the need "to deal comprehensively with the critical threat to the
health and welfare of the State by way of diminished delivery of health care
services as a result of the lack of adequate medical malpractice insurance
coverage at reasonable rates"); see also Jennifer M. Chow, CPLR 214-a, 208:
Appellate Division, Third Department, Holds that the Statute of Limitations on
an Infant's Malpractice Suit for Prenatal Injuries Begins to Run from the Time
of Malpractice Even if the Malpractice Occurs Before the Child is Born, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 675 (1995).
' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 105(j) (McKinney 2015). An "infant" is a person who has not
attained the age of eighteen years. Id.
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claims, the entire period of disability is the tolling period, subject
however to a ten year tolling limit from the date of the accrual of
the claim.4
Thus, where an infant claims medical malpractice, a suit
must be commenced within two and one-half years after the person
reaches majority, but no later than ten years after accrual of the
claim, even if the person is then still an infant. On its face, this
appears to be a balancing of the perceived need for a short statute
of limitations for bringing medical malpractice cases to help stem
the malpractice crisis, and that of protecting infants, allowing them
an extended time to bring their claims.5
In certain instances this balancing succeeds in allowing the
infant to pursue a medical malpractice action, either because a
responsible parent or guardian timely brings an action on behalf of
an infant,6 or because the infant comes of age within the limitation
time (including as tolled) and is able to bring the action on his or
her own behalf.' Other times the action is precluded from going
forward because no action is brought on behalf of the person still
in infancy, and the statute as tolled nevertheless runs before the
I N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 2015) ("If a person entitled to commence an
action is under a disability because of infancy... at the time the cause of action
accrues, and the time otherwise limited for commencing the action is ... less
than three years, the time [for commencing an action] shall be extended by the
period of disability. The time within which the action must be commenced shall
not be extended by this provision beyond ten years after the cause of action
accrues, except, in any action other than for medical, dental or podiatric
malpractice, where the person was under a disability due to infancy." (emphasis
added)).
5 See N.Y. CLS C.P.L.R. 208 advisory committee's note (McKinney 2015)
("The provisions for extension because of the existence of the stated disabilities
[ including infancy] present controversial policy questions .... An infant should
not be penalized for the inaction of his parent or guardian ... but, while these
disabilities should continue to be recognized as grounds for extending the
statutes of limitation, the extension periods should be kept to a minimum,
reasonably adequate to protect the person under a disability and yet not to harass
an obligor unduly.").
6 See, e.g., Strignano ex rel. Strignano v. Jamaica Hosp., 694 N.Y.S.2d 857, 862
(1999).
7 See, e.g., Grabowski v. Kraus, 662 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (1997).
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person reaches majority by virtue of the absolute ten year
limitation.8
While it is hoped that children would be protected and that
their parent/guardians would exercise responsibility to protect a
child who is unable to protect him/herself, it is evident that the
"balance" achieved in New York's infancy tolling scheme for
medical malpractice claims can always achieve its goal of limiting
malpractice claims, but may or may not achieve its goal or
protecting infants due to the ten year limit on tolling.9 Whatever
success or lack thereof this balancing may have achieved in the
1970's, recent data show that family structures have since
substantially changed1" in ways that compromise the likelihood
that infants will be protected during the malpractice claims tolling
period.With so many children being born to young single
mothers,11 it would appear that the number and competency of
parents who are traditionally relied upon to guard the welfare of
their children is diminished. 12
8 See, e.g., Lampiasi v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. of N.Y., 422 N.Y.S.2d
81, 83 (1979).
9 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2015). New York suits for claims of medical
malpractice must generally be commenced within two years, six months from
the medical "act, omission, or failure complained of." Id. Thus, where a medical
malpractice claim accrues during infancy, the limitations toll is ten years from
the time of accrual. Accordingly, an infant hanned by medical malpractice at
birth would have to bring suit before turning age eleven.
10 KJ Dell'Antonia, For Younger Mothers, Out-of Wedlock Births Are the New
Normal, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/style/
index.html ("As of 2009, more than half of all children born to women under 30
were born to unmarried women.").
11 Id.
12 See Rachel M. Shattuck & Rose M. Kreider, Social and Economic
Characteristics of Currently Unmarried Women With a Recent Birth: 2011, AM.
CMTY. SURVEY REPORTS (May 2013).
* 81% of new mothers aged fifteen to nineteen were not
married. Id. at 5.
* 62% of new mothers in their early twenties were not
married. Id. at 5.
2015-2016
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If in fact the availability of infants' access to due process to
pursue medical malpractice claims has substantially diminished, is
it time to update the infancy medical malpractice tolling period to
allow for a full tolling of the statute of limitations beyond infancy
so that the ability of infants to pursue claims on their own will be
enhanced? This paper will examine the issues that relate to this
question.
II. NOT JUST A NEW YORK ISSUE
Per Professor David D. Siegel citing the New York State
Court of Appeals (New York's high court), "the Statute of
Limitations was enacted to afford protection to defendants against
defending stale claims after a reasonable period of time had
elapsed during which a person of ordinary diligence would bring
an action."13 As stated, New York's CPLR tolls New York's usual
thirty month limitation for bringing a medical malpractice action
where the plaintiff is under a disability due to infancy, allowing
extension by the period of disability, but limited to 10 years from
the time of accrual.14 While such may or may not effectively
protect an injured New York minor's right to proceed, it is clear
that the risk of a minor's time running out before herself becoming
"a person of ordinary diligence" to bring her own action is
substantial. This risk is clearly significantly increased given the
* Overall increase of births to unwed mothers up to 36% in
2011 from 31% in 2005. -d. at 2.
* Unwed mothers more likely to have less education and
lower incomes than married families. -d. at 4.
* Children of unwed mothers more likely to have
developmental delays which "may be due in part to family
instability." Id. at 1.
* 40% of children likely to be in non-traditional
"cohabitating" homes by age twelve, with such households
being non-marital by the time the child is age fifteen. Id. at
1-2.
13 DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE (West Group 3d ed. 1999) (citing
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427 (1969)).
14Id. at 4, 9.
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contemporary sociological marital data shown above, and
expanded on herein below.
But New York is not alone in putting its infants at such
risk. A survey of limitations rules for the fifty states shows that the
already short statute for medical malpractice claims of most states
(generally between two to three years 15) while generally providing
some tolling accommodation for medically injured infants, most
states do not provide full assurance that tolling will continue past
the prospective plaintiff s eighteenth birthday.
As shown on Table 1 below, only fourteen states-Arizona,
Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Washington-provide such assurance. The plurality of states
restrict the potential of injured infants to pursue a remedy, many
substantially (e.g., Alabama, California, Colorado, and
Massachusetts, etc.). Connecticut, which is home to many large
insurance companies, has no special allowance for infants at all on
its already very short two-year statute.
Whatever the policy motivations that prompted the
shortening of medical malpractice statutes of limitations in the first
place, it is clear that on their face the procedural positions of infant
plaintiffs and health care professional/hospital/professional
liability insurer defendants is out of balance in most of the United
States. In almost every instance (other than certain special
considerations such as "date of discovery" of malpractice not
otherwise addressed here) the prospective defendants, virtually
always "persons of ordinary diligence," engage a defined
limitations period beyond which a remedy cannot be had by the
plaintiff, while New York and the plurality of the other states
subordinate infants to a position of being only sometimes protected
in their ability to themselves effectively pursue their claims.
Such imbalance thus appears to work fundamental
procedural and substantive inequity against minors, a class of
15 See infra Table 1.
2015-2016
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Vol. XXXIV
citizens for whom our society otherwise generally staunchly asserts
need society's protections.
Table 1
State General SOL Rule Minors Rule
Alabama 2 years from act or 4 year limit starts once the
omission. If discovered minor turns 8.17
later than 6 months after
discovery. 16
Alaska 2 years from act or 2 year limit starts once the
omission. 18  minor turns 8, or 18 if
mentally disabled. 19
Arizona 2 years from act or 2 year limit starts at age of
omission. 20  majority. 21
Arkansas 2 years from act or If under age 9, has until
omission. If discovered 11 th birthday. 23
later than 1 year after
discovery.22
California 3 years from date of injury 3 years, but if under age 6,
or 1 year from date that the has the greater of 3 years
injury is or should have or until 8th birthday. 25
been discovered through
due diligence, whichever is
less. 24
Colorado 2 years from act or If under age 6, has until
omission. If discovered 8th birthday. 27
16 ALA. CODE § 6-2-38 (2005).
17 ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (2005).
" ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (2006).
19 ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (2006).
20 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (2007).
21 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (2007).
22 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-203 (2007).
23 id.21 CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (Deering 2016).
25 Td.
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27 Id.
26 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102.5 (2013).
28 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (2015).
29 Id.
3 o DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (2015).
31 Id.
32 FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (2015).
33 Id.
31 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-71(a)-(b) (2015).
35 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-73 (2015).
36 HAW. REV. STAT.§ 657-7.3 (2015).37 Id
later than 1 year after
discovery.2
6
Connecticut 2 years from injury or No special allowances.29
discovery, but no later than
3 years from act or
omission.
28
Delaware 2 years from act or If under age 6, has until
omission of treatment, if 6th birthday or 2 years,
discovered later than 1 year whichever is longer.3'
after discovery.30
Florida 2 years from injury or Until 8th birthday, or
discovery, but no later than normal statute, whichever
4 years from act or is longer.33
omission.
32
Georgia 2 years from injury or If under 5, has until 7th
discovery, but no later than birthday generally, but
5 years from act or may be extended up to
omission. If foreign object 10th birthday E.g., if the
left in body, then 1 year injury was not reasonably
from discovery. 34  ascertainable by age 7 and
occurred prior to age 5.35
Hawaii 2 years from injury or If under age 6, has until
discovery, but no later than 10th birthday or 6 years to
6 years from act or file, whichever is longer.37
omission.
36
2015-2016
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38 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-219 (2015).
'9 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-230 (2015).
40 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-212 (2015).
4 1 id.
42 IND. CODE § 34-18-7-1 (2015).
41 IND. CODE § 34-18-7-2 (2015).
44 IOWA CODE § 614.1 (2015).
45 
Sd.
46 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (2015).
47 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-515 (2015).
4 8 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 413.140 (West 2015).49 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.170 (West 2015).
106
Idaho 2 years from act or Statute tolled while minor
omission. 1 year from but no more than 6 years
discovery of a foreign from act or omission.
39
object.38
Illinois 2 years from injury or If under age of 18, has 8
discovery, but no later than years, or until 22
4 years from act or birthday.41
omission. 4
0
Indiana 2 years from act or If under age of 6, has until
omission. 42  8th birthday.
43
Iowa 2 years from injury or If under age of 8, has until
discovery, but no later than 10th birthday.
45
6 years from act or
omission. 4
4
Kansas 2 years from occurrence, or 1 year after turning 18, but
up to 4 years if the injury is not more than 8 years from
not reasonably injury. 47
ascertainable until
sometime after the initial
act.
46
Kentucky 1 year from occurrence or 1 year after turning 18, or
discovery, but no later than are married. 49
5 years after date of
injury. 48
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5 0 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (2015).5 1 id.
52 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24 § 2902 (2015).
5 3 Id.
51 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-109 (West 2015).
5 5 ]d.
5 6 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (2015).
5 7 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2015).
5 8 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (2015).
5 9 MICH. COMP. LAWS.§ 600.5851 (2015).
Louisiana 1 year from occurrence or No special allowances.5
discovery, but no longer
than 3 years after date of
injury. °50
Maine 3 years from act or 3 years after 1 8th birthday,
omission. If foreign object or 6 years from
left in body then 3 years negligence, whichever
from discovery. 52  comes first.53
Maryland 3 years from injury or Minors have until 11 th
discovery, but no later than birthday, or normal statute,
5 years from act or whichever is longer.5
5
omission.
54
Massachusetts 3 years from injury or If under age 6, has until
discovery, but no later than 9th birthday, or 7 years
7 years from act or from act or omission,
omission. 56  whichever comes first.5
7
Michigan 2 years from occurrence, or If under age of 8, has until
6 months from discovery.58 10th birthday or 2 years,
whichever is longer. For
reproductive injuries under
age 13, has until 15th
birthday, or 2 years,
whichever is longer.
Under age 18 has 1 year
after 1 8th birthday, but no
more than 2 years after
injury. 5 9
2015-2016
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6 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.076 (2015).
61 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.15 (2015).
62 MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (2015).
63 ld.
64 Mo. REV. STAT.§ 516.105 (2014).
65 ]d.
66 MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-20 (2015).
67 
§d.68 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (2015).
6 9 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-213 (2015).
70 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.097 (2015).
7 1 id
Minnesota 4 years from negligence.60  1 year after their 18th
birthday, but not more
than 7 years after
occurrence.
6 1
Mississippi 2 years from occurrence or If under age of 6, has 2
discovery, but no longer years following 6th
than 7 years after date of birthday.63
injury. 62
Missouri 2 years from occurrence or If under age of 18, has
discovery, whichever until 20th birthday, or 10
occurs first.64  years from the date of
discovery, whichever is
later.6
5
Montana 3 years from discovery, but If under age of 4, the 3
no longer than 5 years after years begin on their 8th
date of injury.66  birthday. 67
Nebraska 2 years from occurrence or Statute is tolled until 21 st
1 year from time of birthday.69
discovery, but no more
than 10 years after date of
injury. 68
Nevada 3 years from occurrence or 3 year statute, unless brain
1 year from date of damage or birth defects
discovery.70  then family has until 10th
birthday. If child becomes
sterile then must file 2
years from date the injury
is discovered. 71
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72 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:4 (2015).
73 Id.
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West 2015).
75 Td.
76 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 (2015).
77 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-10 (2015).
7 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2015).
79 N.Y.C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 2015). A claim for medical malpractice, which
has a statute of limitations of 30 months under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a, can be
brought at any time until the minor reaches his/her 18th birthday, but the tolling
period cannot exceed 10 years. Id.
'IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (2015).
1 N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 1-17 (2015).
New Hampshire 3 years from occurrence or If under age 18, has until
discovery.72  20th birthday. 73
New Jersey 2 years from occurrence or 2years after 1 8th birthday.
discovery.74  Birth injuries must be filed
by 13th birthday.
75
New Mexico 3 years. 76  1 year after reaching the
age of majority.77
New York 30 months from 30 months from 18th
occurrence, or 1 year from birthday, but must be
time of discovery of a within 10 years.
79
foreign object.78
North Carolina 3 years from injury or 1 year from 1 8th birthday,
death, or 2 years from if given consent order by
discovery to file suit up to court. Has until 10th
4 years. 1 year from birthday otherwise, and
discovery of a foreign regular rules apply.8
object but not more than 10
years after the procedure.8°0
2015-2016
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82 N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18 (2015).
83 N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (2015.
84 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113 (LexisNexis 2015).
85 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.16 (LexisNexis 2015).
86 OKLA STAT. tit. 76, § 18 (2015).
87 OKLA STAT. tit. 12, § 96 (2015).
88 OR. REV. STAT.§ 12.110 (2015).
89 OR. REv. STAT.§ 12.160 (2015).
90 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.605 (2015).
91 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.513 (2015).
92 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (2015).
93 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (2015).
North Dakota 2 years from when injury No limitations extended
should have been noticed; more than 12 years.8 3
if late discovery, then the
limit is 6 years.82
Ohio 1 year from the act or lack Statute tolled until the age
of care. Must be filed 180 of majority is reached."
days after notice is given,
or 1 year from discovery of
a foreign object, but cannot
exceed 4 year statute.8
4
Oklahoma 2 years. 6  If under age 12, has 7
years to file claim, if over
the age of 12, has 1 year
after 18th birthday.87
Oregon 2 year from time of injury 5 years from malpractice,
or discovery, but no more or 1 year after 18th
than 5 years.88  birthday, whichever is
earlier.89
Pennsylvania 2 years from time of act or 2 years from 18th
lack of proper care. 90  birthday. If emancipated
minor then he/she has only
2 years. 91
Rhode Island 3 years from action or lack If under age of 18, has
of proper care. 92  until 3 year of reaching
that age to file. 93
110 Vol. XXXIV
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South Carolina 3 years from occurrence, or 7 years from malpractice,
2 year from discovery of or 1 year after 18th
foreign object.94  birthday, whichever is
less.95
South Dakota 2 years.96  1 year from 18th
birthday.
97
Tennessee 1 year from time of 1 year from 18th
malpractice; if foreign birthday.99
object is left in body then
one year from the time
discovered, or should have
been found. 98
Texas 2 years from act or lack of If under age 12, must take
treatment. Cannot be taken action by child's 14th
after 10 years.'00  birthday (this section has
been held to violate the
Texas Constitution). 10 1
Utah 2 years after the injury is All causes of action other
discovered, or through the than for the recovery of
use of reasonable diligence real property are tolled
should have discovered, during minority. 103
but not to exceed 4 years
after the date of the alleged
act, omission, neglect, or
occurrence, or 1 year from
9' S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-3-545 (2015).
9 5 
Td.
96 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-14.1 (2015).
97 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-22 (2015).
9 8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-116 (2015).
99 TENN. CODE ANN. 29-1-106 (2015).
100TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.25 1(a) (West 2015).
101 Id.; see Adams v. Gottwald, 179 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding this
section unconstitutional under TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 as applied to minors); see
also Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983) (discussed infra at
Section III).
2015-2016
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discovery of foreign
object.'02
Vermont 3 years for most cases, 2 Statute begins on 18th
years from time of injury birthday, but no action
or injury should have been taken if more than 7
reasonably been years. 105
discovered. 104
Virginia 2 years from occurrence or If under age of 8, has until
1 year from discovery of 10th birthday. 1
07
foreign object, but no more
than 10 years.'0 6
Washington 3 years or 1 year from time 3 years from 18th
injury should have been birthday.10 9
discovered, but no longer
than 8 years. 108
West Virginia 2 years from time injury is Until the age of 12, or 2
discovered, or time of years from the time of
wrongful death." 0  injury. 111
Wisconsin 3 years from time of Until 10th birthday, or
malpractice or 1 year from within 3 years, whichever
the discovery of the injury, is later." 3
whichever comes first. 112
Wyoming 2 years from action or Prior to 8th birthday, or
omission of care, or 2 years within 2 year of
from reasonable revelation occurrence, whichever is
of the injury.i14  later.i15
103 UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-108 (LexisNexis 2015).
102 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-404 (LexisNexis2015).
104 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (2015).
105 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,§ 551 (2015).
106 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (2015).
107 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243.1 (2015).
108 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350 (2015).
109 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16-190 (2015).
110W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (2015).
11 Td.
112 WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2015).113 WIS. STAY. § 893.56 (2015).
114 WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-3-107 (2015).
115 Td.
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION/DUE PROCESS
ISSUES
The apparent disparity in access to justice for infants in the
medical malpractice arena prompts the question of whether the
disparate treatment is unconstitutional under federal and/or state
equal protection and due process principles. 116 Although the U.S.
Supreme Court has not ruled on the matter, it has generally been
held under both federal and state court rulings that the legal
treatment for short statutes of limitations for claiming medical
malpractice is constitutional.117
Although the clear trend has been that these statutes are a
permissible exercise of state police powers and violate neither the
Unites States Constitution nor State Constitutions generally,
118
there is some significant precedent to the contrary.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"' See, e.g., Douglas v. Hugh A. Stallings, M.D., Inc., 870 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir.
1989) (holding the that economic or social legislation which does not involve
suspect classifications or infringe on a fundamental interest is presumed
constitutional and will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest); see also Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1988) (holding that
New York's statute of limitations did not violate due process or equal protection
guarantees).
118 See e.g., Raley v. Wagner, 57 S.W.3d 683 (Ark. 2001) (holding two-year
statute of limitations for minors' claims did not violate the equal protection and
due process clauses of the federal or state Constitutions); Crowe v. Humana
Hosp., 439 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. 1994) (holding that statute of limitations on minor's
medical malpractice claims does not violate equal protection); Ledbetter v.
Hunter, 842 N.E.2d 810 (Ind. 2006) (holding statute of limitations on minors
under Medical Malpractice Act did not violate Privileges and Immunities
Clause); Plummer v. Gillieson, 692 N.E.2d 528 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding
malpractice statute of repose for medical malpractice claims brought on behalf
of minors is constitutional); Harlfinger v. Martin, 754 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 2001)
(holding statute of repose for medical malpractice actions on behalf of minors
satisfied due process and equal protection); Batek v. Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
920 S.W.2d 895(Mo. 1996) (holding statute of limitations applicable to medical
malpractice does not create special law for limitation of civil actions in violation
2015-2016
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Washington State's Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue in Schroeder v. Weighal,119 where plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice claim one day before his 19th birthday involving the
misreading of a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan taken
when he was nine years old. The Superior Court dismissed the
complaint as barred by Washington State's statute of limitations on
minors' malpractice claims that require such claims to be filed
within three years of the act or omission or one year from the date
that the act or omission was or should have reasonably been
discovered. The omission was discovered in 2009 while plaintiff
was a minor, but an action was not commenced until the day prior
to the plaintiffs 19th birthday. The case was dismissed as time
barred, but the Washington State Supreme Court reversed on
grounds that requiring minors to institute claims during their
minority for medical malpractice while other statutes of limitations
for minors' claims are generally tolled until they reach the age of
consent12  violates the Washington State Constitution's
prohibitions on special privileges and immunities.121
of State Constitution); Estate of McCarthy v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
Silverbow County 994 P.2d 1090 (Mont. 1999) (holding malpractice limitations
period for a minor's claims did not violate equal protection); Willis v. Mullett,
561 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 2002) (holding medical malpractice statute of limitations
for minors was constitutional); Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisc. Patients
Compensation Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849 (Wisc. 2000) (holding malpractice
statutes of repose on malpractice actions of minors do not violate State
Constitution's right-to-remedy clause).
119 Schroeder v. Weighall, 316 P.3d 482 (Wash. 2014).
120 WASH REV. CODE ANN.§ 4.16.190 reads as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided in this section, if a person
entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter,
except for a penalty or forfeiture, or against a sheriff or
other officer, for an escape, be at the time the cause of
action accrued either under the age of eighteen years, or
incompetent or disabled to such a degree that he or she
cannot understand the nature of the proceedings, such
incompetency or disability as determined according to
chapter 11.88 Wash Rev. Code Ann., or imprisoned on a
criminal charge prior to sentencing, the time of such
disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the
commencement of action.
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Ohio's Supreme Court addressed the issue in Schwan v.
Riverside Methodist Hospita1122 in 1983 in which a minor patient
sued a hospital to recover for allegedly negligent treatment by
hospital employees. The trial court granted the hospital's motion
for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for Franklin County
reversed, and the case came before the Ohio Supreme Court on the
allowance of a motion to certify the record. The Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed in a 4-1 ruling that held the medical malpractice
limitations statute, which requires a minor of ten years of age or
older to file a medical malpractice action within one year, to be
"unconstitutional because it violates the right of medical
malpractice litigants who are minors to 'equal protection." 123
Writing for the majority, Justice Locher noted:
Our review of the language of R.C.
2305.11(B) leads us to conclude that the statute
creates a distinction-without reasonable grounds-
between medical malpractice litigants who are
younger than ten years of age and those who are
older than ten but still minors. For example, under
R.C. 2305.11(B) a child whose cause of action
(2) Subsection (1) of this section with respect to a person
under the age of eighteen years does not apply to the time
limited for the commencement of an action under WASH
REV. CODE ANN.§ 4.16.350[, the section that imposes a
statute of limitations for medical malpractice generally].
121 See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Regular
Session)(providing that "[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class
of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations");
see also Schroeder, 316 P.3d at 482 (holding that limiting a minor's right to toll
medical malpractice claims until he/she reaches the age of majority grants an
immunity to the defendant and burdens the minor plaintiff's privilege to bring a
negligence claim and that to do so requires the state to meet a more exacting test
than a rational basis review).
122 Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983).
123 Jd.at 301 (citing OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 2).
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accrues on the day before his tenth birthday may
file an action any time until his fourteenth birthday.
Yet, if the same cause of action accrued on the day
after the child's tenth birthday, the one year (plus
notice) provision of R.C. 2305.11(A) apparently
controls.
We recognize that the General Assembly
often must draw lines in legislation. Yet, it is the
age of majority which establishes the only rational
distinction. 124
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court again weighed in on
the issue of the constitutionality of medical malpractice statutes in
a series of four cases appealing dismissals at trial of minors'
medical malpractice claims barred by statutes of limitations which
required minors to bring medical malpractice actions within one
year from the date the cause of action accrued, or four years from
date that the alleged malpractice occurred, whichever came first. 125
The Court struck down the medical malpractice statute as applied
to minors on grounds that it violated sections 1 and 16 of article I
of the Ohio Constitution. 
126
In New Mexico, the Court of Appeals in Jaramillo v.
Heaton127 held that a statute of limitations requiring minors injured
1241 d. at 302.
125 Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986).
126 Id. at 723. The relevant Ohio Constitution sections read as follows: "All men
are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and
safety." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1.
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay. Suits may be brought
against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be
provided by law.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16.
127 Jaramillo v. Heaton, 100 P.3d 204 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
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through medical malpractice before the age of six to bring a claim
by their ninth birthday violates minors' due process rights because
it is unreasonable to expect a child to bring a claim on his or her
own behalf at the age of nine. 128
A Texas statute that required minors who reached the age
of six to begin medical malpractice claims within two years was
found to be in violation of the due process provisions in article I,
section 13 of the Texas Constitution in Sax v. Votteler.129 The case
involved a minor who had one of her fallopian tubes removed in
error instead of her appendix. In reversing the lower court's
granting of the physician's motion for summary judgment of the
malpractice action brought by the child's parents when she was 11
years old, the Texas Supreme Court noted:
If the parents, guardians, or next friends of the child
negligently fail to take action in the child's behalf
within the time provided by article 5.82, the child is
precluded from asserting his cause of action under
that statute. Furthermore, the child is precluded
from suing his parents on account of their
negligence, due to the doctrine of parent-child
immunity. The child, therefore, is effectively barred
from any remedy if his parents fail to timely file
suit. Respondents argue that parents will adequately
protect the rights of their children. This Court,
however, cannot assume that parents will act in
such a manner. It is neither reasonable nor realistic
to rely upon parents, who may themselves be
minors, or who may be ignorant, lethargic, or lack
concern, to bring a malpractice lawsuit action
within the time provided by article 5.82.130
1281 d. at 503.
129 Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983); see also Adams v.
Gottwald, 179 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App. 2005); supra note 101.
130 Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667 (citation omitted).
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Utah's Supreme Court struck down a statute that imposed a
two-year and four-year statute of limitations on the medical
malpractice claims of minors in Lee v. Gaufin,131 holding these to
be unconstitutional under article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution (providing that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation"). 132 In language similar to that of the
Texas Supreme Court in Sax v. Votteler, 133 the Utah Supreme
Court noted:
Although lawsuits asserting a violation of a
minor's rights may be brought by parents, general
guardians, or next friends as guardians ad litem,
such persons have no legal duty to assert or
otherwise protect a minor's legal claims. If parents
and guardians fail to assert a minor's claim because
they are neglectful, unavailable, or disinterested, or
because they have a conflict of interest in filing a
lawsuit for the minor, the minor's legal claim can
never be asserted when a statute of limitations bars
the cause of action before the minor reaches
majority. Accordingly, the general rule for over 360
years has been that statutes of limitations are tolled
for minors. 
134
A similar result was reached by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp.. In this case, a minor's
medical malpractice claim arising from negligent treatment of a 15
year old was dismissed at trial for exceeding the two-year statute
of limitation when the minor filed the malpractice claim at the age
of 19.135 The Court held (in a 4-3 decision) the statute of
limitations violated article I, section 14 of the Missouri
131 Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993).
132 UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24.
133 Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666.
134 Lee, 867 P.2d at 578 (citations omitted).
135 Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986).
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Constitution "which guarantees to every Missouri citizen 'that the
courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person. '"136
In New York, the court in Helgans v. Plurad137 held that
"[a] statute comports with due process if the Legislature, in
enacting it, was 'acting in pursuit of permissible State objectives
and . . . the means adopted [were] reasonably related to the
accomplishment of those objectives. "138 The court went on to cite
part of the legislative rationale for the short limitations periods:
The medical malpractice Statute of Limitations was
shortened from three years to two years and six
months by the 1975 enactment of CPLR 214-a in
response to the "critical threat to the health and
welfare of the State by way of diminished delivery
of health care services as a result of the lack of
adequate medical malpractice insurance coverage at
reasonable rates." 13
9
The court stated that "[C]learly, the objective of preserving the
quality of health care services for residents of the State is a
legitimate governmental obj ective."141
Regarding equal protection, the Helgans court further
stated that "[A] Statute of Limitations is not deemed arbitrary or
unreasonable solely on the basis of its harsh effect in a particular
case." 
14 1
136 Id. at 8-9 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 14); see also Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 14
(providing "[t]hat the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right
and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay").
137 Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1998).
138 Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 54 (1975)).
139 Id.at 650 (citing Governor's Mem. on L. 1975, ch. 109, 1975 NY Legis. Ann.,
at 1739-40).
14 Id. at 650 (citing Treyball v. Clark, 65 N.Y.2d 589, 590 (1985)).
141Id. at 650.
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While the allegedly injured plaintiff in Helgans was not a
minor and so was subject to New York's normal two and one-half
year statute of limitations, the strict manner in which due process
and equal protection are interpreted in that and similar cases serves
to magnify the legal effect on minors.
Exacerbating this problem for all and especially for infants
are extremely stringent "notice of claim" rules that may exist in
certain jurisdictions. These notice rules serve as a prerequisite for
bringing claims against governmental units.
In New York, for example, to bring a tort action against a
municipality, including against a municipal hospital for medical
malpractice, a notice of claim against the municipality must be
filed within ninety days after the occurrence of the claim.142
Inasmuch as this rule is not subject to tolling for infants (although
on motion the court may consider infancy in deciding whether to
permit a late filing),143 it would appear that the potential
consequences on minors suffering medical malpractice injury at a
municipal institution can be extremely harsh indeed.
From both legal and practical points of view, it is necessary
to address the question: if competent adults, as in Helgans, are
sometimes unable to meet the short statutory and very short time
requirements for bringing suit, how can society expect that minors,
especially those at greater risk due to poverty, uneducated parents,
and/or lack of a responsible adult who cares, will always be so
able?
IV. FURTHER COMPLICATIONS
Traditionally, American society relied on the nuclear
family to provide the most local of governance and protection of
children. Coincident with the time beginning with the 1970's
through the present, the same time frame thus far addressed by the
142 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW. § 50-c (McKinney 2015).
143 N.Y.GEN. MUN. LAW.§ 50-e(5) (McKinney 2015); see also Robert Vilensky
& Erica Podolsky, Children Are Not So Precious Under Medical Malpractice
Laws, 250 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2013) (including discussion of New York court's
reluctance to approve motions to allow late filings of notices of claim).
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statutes of limitations rules addressing the medical malpractice
crisis, a dramatic shift has taken place in American family
structure. As discussed earlier, this trend, as regards the continuing
increase in the percentage of young mothers who are unwed, can
have serious deleterious effects on the care of children born in such
situations. While many families continue to be look out for the
affairs of their minor children, is not necessarily the case across the
board.
From a medical care perspective, data show that the need to
protect our children in our contemporary climate is critical. Per
National Center for Health Statistics ("NCHS") Data Brief Number
18 (published on May 2009), "[n]onmarital births are at higher risk
of having adverse birth outcomes such as low birthweight, preterm
birth, and infant mortality than are children born to married
women. Children born to single mothers typically have more
limited social and financial resources." 144 While teenage births are
down steeply (50% in 1970 to 23% as of 2007145), 86% of teenage
births in 2007 were nonmarital (and do continue to decline 146).147
General evidence showing a direct relationship between
birth rates and years of education attained by women, with the
highest birth rates among mothers with the least education 148 has
persisted for some time. 149 For example, in 1994 unmarried women
aged 18 to 24 having zero to eight years of total education had a
birth rate of 300 per thousand compared with less than 25 per
144 See Stephanie J. Ventura, Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in
the United States, NCHS DATA BRIEF (Nat. Ctr. for Health Statistics), May
2009, at 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/dbl8.pdf (citations
omitted).145 
_d. at 4-5.
146 Id. at 1.
147 Id.
148 T.J. Matthews & Stephanie J. Ventura, Birth and Fertility Rates by
Educational Attainment: United States 1994, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS
REPORT (Nat. Ctr. for Health Statistics), April 24, 1997, at 3.
149 1d. at5.
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thousand with sixteen years or more of education. 150 This pattern
was constant for all age groups over eighteen. 151 Further, this
relationship of educational attainment for unmarried women was
directly opposite that for married women 15 as it is now.
153
Finally, recent emigration into the U.S., both documented
and not, has resulted in many new residents not acquainted with
American law, culture, and the English language. As a practical
matter, many of this new population are at an obvious
disadvantage in navigating the American judicial systems, and this
is particularly acute in any efforts at protecting their children.
Under American Constitutional Law, any child born in the U.S. is
a United States citizen, 154 so even where immigrant parents are in
the U.S. illegally, children born to them are not. The ability of new
immigrant parents, and particularly those in the U.S. illegally, to
protect in favor of the medical needs of their children, including
guarding against and pursuing legal claims for medical
malpractice, are significantly compromised. 155
Synthesis of this data supports the following conclusions:
" The majority of contemporary births in the U.S.
continue to be to married couples.
" A substantial number of contemporary births are
to unmarried mothers, including young and very
young mothers, and a substantial number of
additional children will live in broken families.
" Nonmarital born children have higher medical and
mortality risks than do children born to married
couples.
150 1d. at 6.
151 Td.
1521 d. at 13.
153 Id. at 5.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1.
155 See Vilensky & Podolsky, supra note 142; Schwan v. Riverside Methodist
Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983) (discussing America's new immigrant
population and for a discussion regarding malpractice cost impacts of the related
tort reform measures).
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" Nonmarital born children are more likely to have
more limited social and financial resources than
children born to married couples.
" Uneducated unmarried women have substantially
more nonmarital children than educated unmarried
women, with a plurality of teenage mothers (thus
having limited education) being unwed.
" There is a special need to protect children of new
immigrants.
Consideration of and access to the American legal system
generally require attributes and resources atypical of the profile
that continues to emerge for an increasing segment of American
children. Those attributes and resources include:
" A family structure that provides greater assurance
that the child's needs are diligently attended to; in
this regard, "two parents are (generally) better than
one";
" Access to competent pre-natal and childhood
medical care, including the knowledge and
financial resources, including insurance, that
facilitate such access, so as to minimize both the
risk of illness as well as the potential consequence
of medical malpractice to the child;
" Knowledge on the part of a parent or guardian as
to when legal resort on behalf of the child is
warranted; when and how to pursue same; and
how to make necessary financial arrangements to
do so; and
" Familiarity with American systems of justice and
reasonable access thereto, including sensible rules
that do not preclude reasonable opportunity to
redress medical injuries of children.
Conversely, the profile of prospective defendants in
medical malpractice claims, doctors, hospitals, and their
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professional liability insurance carriers includes the following
attributes:
* They are a highly educated, knowledgeable and
sophisticated group of persons;
* Substantial political influence, as indicated, for
example, by the aforesaid curtailed statute of
limitations rules of the 1970's;
* Access to a high quality medical malpractice
defense bar;
* Significant financial resources with which to
defend and settle malpractice claims; and
* A substantial imbalance as to the certainty with
which the statute of limitations rules apply to
them, as compared with the uncertainty with
which they can apply to minor plaintiffs.
While the medical profession and its insurers admittedly
grapple with issues that are arguably unfair to them (for example,
their argument for capping the dollar amount of court awards to
prevailing plaintiffs), it is clear that the statute of limitations issue
at hand regarding minors represents a substantial due process
imbalance between these parties in favor of the medical profession,
despite the success of the "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest '  argument under which such has been found
constitutional. In a society that professes to "put children first", the
imbalance is striking, even in the face of the concerns of the
medical profession that prompted the very limited statute of
limitations for infants.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that it is not the 1970s anymore, and that
American society and social needs have changed substantially
since then. Whatever considerations prompted the need for medical
malpractice tort reform then need to be revisited in light of the very
156 See supra note 117.
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clear practical disparity that has emerged between how the
contemporary American legal system treats children-plaintiffs vis a
vis medical defendants. The gap is wide and unfair, the traditional
technical equal protection and due process rules notwithstanding.
It is worthy of note that there is no clear evidence to
support the thesis that severely limiting minors' time for
commencing medical malpractice actions effects a meaningful
reduction of malpractice costs, which savings were a fundamental
premise of the legislative changes shortening the limitations
periods in the 1970s.
Of further note is that traditional evidentiary problems that
militated in favor of shorter statutes of limitations are minimized in
the contemporary medical environment via electronic record
keeping and back-up systems that allow for comprehensive
medical record keeping, retention, and long-term storage.
Legal rules must keep up with the times if they are to be
relevant and fair. The times have changed and the rules should
change with them. Certainly a medical malpractice statute of
limitations rule that would provide infants until the age of majority
plus a reasonable time thereafter to commence a claim against any
applicable person, private or municipal, would go far in providing
greater equity in our legal system for our children.
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